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SHOULD JURIES HEAR COMPLEX PATENT 
CASES? 
JENNIFER F. MILLER1 
ABSTRACT 
A debate has arisen within the legal community over the 
existence and constitutionality of a so-called “complexity 
exception” to the Seventh Amendment.  This exception would give a 
judge the discretion to deny a jury trial in a civil case if he or she 
feels that the issue is too complex for a jury to decide properly.  
This iBrief discusses the constitutionality of the complexity 
exception and the arguments for and against its implementation, 
with particular emphasis on the application of the exception to 
patent infringement cases. The iBrief then postulates that, while a 
blanket exception for patent infringement cases may not be the 
solution, at a minimum some restructuring of the adjudication 
process needs to occur in order to ensure that judicial holdings are 
more than a mere roll of the dice.  
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 With the rise in both the complexity and the importance of patent 
infringement cases, as well as the need for consistency in the field of patent 
law, many legal scholars and practitioners have begun to speculate as to 
whether juries are competent to hear patent infringement cases.  Some 
commentators argue that a “complexity exception” to the Seventh 
Amendment right to a jury trial should be invoked, which would give 
judges discretion to withhold cases from a jury where the complexity of the 
facts or the underlying legal issues make it impossible for a jury to render a 
fair and rational verdict.  The constitutional support for the “complexity 
exception” is grounded in Seventh Amendment jurisprudence and on the 
Fifth Amendment right of due process.  This iBrief discusses the 
constitutionality of the “complexity exception,” as well as the advantages 
and disadvantages of invoking such an exception.  It then concludes that, 
while a blanket exception for patent infringement cases may not be the 
solution, some restructuring of the adjudication process needs to occur in 
order to ensure that the judicial holdings are not random or baseless. 
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I. THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT 
A. Historical Background 
¶2 The Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution states:  
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed 
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact 
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the 
United States, than according to the rules of the common law.2  
When adopted in 1789, the Constitution did not include the right to a trial 
by jury in civil cases.  The founders considered and rejected the idea of 
including the right based on the argument that the states’ civil trial practices 
differed so markedly that such a provision would be impossible to draft.3  
However, during ratification of the Constitution, many states objected to the 
absence of an explicit right to civil jury trials.4  This objection ultimately led 
the first Congress to include the Seventh Amendment in the Bill of Rights.5   
¶3 The task of defining the scope of the Amendment has been arduous, 
particularly since little guidance can be gleaned from the circumstances 
surrounding its adoption.  No record of the congressional debates 
surrounding the Amendment’s adoption exists,6 and the debate over the 
original constitutional provision that was ultimately abandoned is 
“unilluminating.”7     
¶4 However, the language of the Amendment itself provides some 
guidance as to its scope.  First, as defined, the right applies only to “Suits at 
common law.”  Second, the right to a jury is “preserved,” as opposed to 
“guaranteed.”  The framers arguably chose such vague terms in drafting the 
                                                     
2 U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
3  
Delegates Pinckney and Gerry formally moved to have the following 
language added to the Constitution: ‘And a trial by jury shall be preserved 
as usual in civil cases.’ . . . Delegates Gorham and King, however, 
objected, stating that different states constituted their juries differently and 
used them in different types of actions; the proposed amendment was 
subsequently rejected. 
2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 628-29 (quoted in 
Douglas King, Complex Civil Litigation and the Seventh Amendment Right to a 
Jury Trial, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 581, 585  n. 16 (1984)). 
4 King, supra note 3, at 585. 
5 Id. 
6 Deborah M. Altman, Defining the Role of the Jury in Patent Litigation: The 
Court Takes Inventory, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 699, 704 (1997). 
7 King, supra note 3, at 585. 
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Amendment because of “the fluid state of the right to a jury trial at the 
time.”8  In addition, the use of the term “preserve” indicates that the drafters 
intended, not to create a new right, but to recognize an existing one.9  This 
then begs the question: What is the scope of the right being preserved? 
B. Historical Test 
¶5 Justice Story answered this question in United States v. Wonson,10 
when he wrote that the right preserved by the Seventh Amendment is the 
right that existed at English common law and not the “common law of any 
individual state.”11  History, therefore, attributes Justice Story with devising 
the “historical test” for applying the Seventh Amendment.  Under the 
“historical test,” a “jury trial . . . [is granted] if one would have been granted 
under similar conditions by English common law”12; the test applies the 
English common law of 1791, the year the Seventh Amendment was 
adopted.13 
¶6 However, the question arose as to how courts should apply the test 
to causes of action unknown to 1791 common law.  In Parsons v. Bedford,14 
another case heard by Justice Story, the United States Supreme Court held 
that the right to a jury was not limited to “suits, which the common law 
recognized among its old and settled proceedings, but [rather the right 
extends to] suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained and 
determined, in contradistinction to those where equitable rights alone were 
recognized, and equitable remedies were administered.”15  Therefore, the 
right to a jury trial was not confined solely to causes of action available at 
English common law.16  Rather, as the Supreme Court held in 1987, courts 
are to look at whether or not the cause of action is analogous to an English 
common law case for which a jury was afforded.17  In Tull v. United States, 
                                                     
8 Joseph A. Miron, Jr., Note, The Constitutionality of a Complexity Exception to 
the Seventh Amendment, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 865, 869 (1998). 
9 Id. 
10 29 F. Cas. 745 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750). 
11 Id. at 750 (“Beyond all question, the common law here alluded to is not the 
common law of any individual state (for it probably differs in all), but it is the 
common law of England, the grand reservoir of all our jurisprudence.”). 
12 Miron, supra note 8, at 870-71 (referring to the test as the “mechanistic 
approach” and restating the rule as “if the right a civil jury trial existed at 
common law, it must exist under the Seventh Amendment”). 
13 Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 350 (1898), overruled by Collins v. 
Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990).  
14 28 U.S. 433 (1830). 
15 Id. at 447. 
16 Altman, supra note 6, at 704 (citing Parson, 28 U.S at 446-47). 
17 Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987); see also Chauffers, Teamsters 
& Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565-66 (1990) (holding that 
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the Court, in explaining the test, held that while the Seventh Amendment 
requires “a jury trial on the merits in those actions that are analogous to 
‘Suits at common law[,]’ . . . actions that are analogous to 18th-century 
cases tried in courts of equity or admiralty, do not require a jury trial.”18  
The Court went on to hold that the analysis applies to both common law 
forms of action and those created by Congress.19  Under the “historical 
test,” therefore, a judge will afford a jury trial in cases where the cause of 
action more closely resembles an eighteenth-century legal cause of action, 
than a cause of action in equity, and where the remedy sought is legal in 
nature, as opposed to equitable.20   
¶7 The situation became even more difficult when Congress adopted 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, which merged the courts of 
law and equity.21  Under these rules, modern cases reached a level of 
complexity far surpassing that of English common law cases of 1791 
making it increasingly difficult to compare modern cases to that of 
eighteenth-century England.22  This increase in complexity was due 
primarily to the “liberalization of civil procedure” and the “unprecedented 
proliferation of new causes of action” that resulted from the new procedural 
rules.23   
¶8 It is argued that one result of the increased difficulty of comparison 
is that courts are beginning to slightly alter the “historical test.”24  In so 
doing, these courts recognize that it is more logical and appropriate to apply 
the rationale that underlies the distinction between cases held in courts of 
law and courts of equity than to merely refer to a predetermined list of 
causes of action.25 
¶9 Therefore, one must ask: Does the complexity of today’s cases so 
surpass that of English common law cases of 1791 that the “historical test” 
should no longer apply?  Were complex cases even heard by the courts of 
law in 1791? 
                                                                                                                       
the right to a jury trial exists in causes of action unknown at common law that 
are analogous to eighteenth century forms of action). 
18 Tull, 481 U.S. at 417. 
19 Id. 
20 Miron, supra note 8, at 873. 
21 See FED. R. CIV. P. 2. 
22 Miron, supra note 8, at 872. 
23 King, supra note 3, at 581. 
24 Miron, supra note 8, at 873 (citing Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 
517 U.S. 370, 388 (1996)); see also id. at 887 (citing Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 
531, 538 (1970) (stating that the “practical abilities and limitations of juries” 
should be considered in the decision to grant a jury trial)). 
25 Id. at 873.  
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II. COMPLEXITY EXCEPTION 
¶10 Many legal scholars have proposed a “complexity exception” to the 
Seventh Amendment that would result in a denial of a jury trial when the 
jury is unable to perform its task properly because of either the length of the 
trial or the complexity of the facts or underlying legal issues.  Some argue 
that this exception existed in English common law and thus satisfies the 
“historical test.”26  Others argue that, while an exception did not exist at 
English common law, the “historical test” is nonetheless satisfied because 
the court of law did not in fact hear complex cases even absent an explicit 
exception.27  A final argument for validating the exception is based on the 
Fifth Amendment right of due process.28 
A. Is There a Basis for the Exception in English Common Law? 
1. Complexity exception found in English common law 
¶11 In a paper published in 1998, Joseph Miron argued that a 
“complexity exception” was recognized by the 1791 common law.29  The 
English legal system at the time had two courts: the Court of Chancery 
(Court of Equity) and the Courts of Common Law.  Miron alleged that the 
Chancellor, who decided both the legal and factual issues of cases in the 
Court of Equity, was permitted to take cases out of the Courts of Common 
Law, where they would be heard by juries, when the Chancellor “concluded 
that the case involved issues beyond the understanding of the jury.”30  
Accordingly, Miron concluded that “the principle of removing complex 
cases from a jury was accepted in English common law, and therefore 
should be part of the Seventh Amendment today.”31 
¶12 In support of his conclusion, Miron pointed to several otherwise 
legal causes of action involving extensive materials and complex legal 
issues that were heard by the Chancellor.32 For example, in 1603 the 
Chancellor decided Clench v. Tomley,33 a case involving personal property.  
In asserting jurisdiction over the case, the Chancellor stated that the 
documents, which amounted to the bulk of the case, were too complex for 
an average juror to read and comprehend.34  One court, however, argued 
                                                     
26 See id. at 873-80.  
27 See King, supra note 3, at 584. 
28 See In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1084-86 (3d 
Cir. 1980). 
29 See generally Miron, supra note 8, at 873-80. 
30 Id. at 874. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 876-77, 880. 
33 21 Eng. Rep. 13 (Ch. 1603). 
34 Miron, supra note 8, at 877 (citing Clench, 21 Eng. Rep. at 13). 
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that the report of this decision is likely “inaccurate or incomplete,” or, in the 
alternative, that it is “an aberration, without precedent and subsequently 
disregarded.”35 
¶13 A second case of relevance, though admittedly decided after 1791, 
is the Court of Chancery’s decision in Wedderburn v. Pickering.36  The 
plaintiff in Wedderburn was granted judicial review of a cause of action 
over the ownership of land.37  In granting judicial review, the court held that 
the case could be “more conveniently tried without a jury,” in view of the 
fact that it involved extensive written materials.38  The Chancellor initially 
expressed his usual unwillingness to interfere with a defendant’s right to a 
jury trial, but he admitted an exception “when there is some reason why the 
case cannot be conveniently tried before a jury.”39    
¶14 By stating that a defendant’s common law right to a jury could be 
taken away in select circumstances, the Chancellor was arguably admitting 
the existence of a complexity exception.  Quoting Clark v. Cookson,40 the 
Chancellor explained those situations in which the inconvenience of a jury 
could result in the Chancellor invoking this exception, stating that the rule 
giving a judge discretion to order the case heard by a judge, rather than a 
jury, “was flamed expressly to meet cases which would, under the old 
system, have been tried in the Chancery Division, and which might be 
considered, by reason of involving a mixture of law and fact, or from great 
complexity, or otherwise, not capable of being conveniently tried before a 
jury.”41  Miron concluded, therefore, that the Chancellor clearly felt that the 
Court of Chancery should, and always did, have jurisdiction over complex 
cases.42 
¶15 However, at least one court has refuted such a reading of 
Wedderburn.  The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held in In re 
Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation43 that Clark and 
Wedderburn should be read to imply exactly the opposite of what Miron 
argued.44  The court argued that these cases do not indicate that a 
                                                     
35 In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1082-83 (3d Cir. 
1980).  
36 13 Ch. D. 769 (1879). 
37 Id. at 769. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 771. 
40 2 Ch. D. 746 (1876). 
41 Wedderburn, 13 Ch. D. at 771 (emphasis added). 
42 Miron, supra note 8, at 878. 
43 631 F.2d 1069 (1980).  
44 Id. at 1081.  However, as discussed infra, the Third Circuit ultimately 
accepted a complexity exception to the Seventh Amendment grounded on a due 
process argument.  Id. at 1086. 
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complexity exception existed; rather they indicate that complexity alone 
was never sufficient grounds for relief in equity.45  As the court explained, 
Clark and Wedderburn were decided after the passage of the Court of 
Judicature Acts46 in 1875, which merged the English courts of law and 
equity.47  Under the Act, jury trials were available upon request.48  
However, the court could deny a jury trial for an issue that, prior to the 
Acts, would have been heard by a court of equity.49  The Chancellor in 
Clark was defining this exception and, according to the Third Circuit, in so 
doing, “identifie[d] two separate prerequisites to a denial of a jury trial 
demand: trial of the matter in the court of chancery prior to the merger and 
complexity or other grounds for believing that a jury would be 
unsuitable.”50  According to the Third Circuit, the Chancellor’s use of the 
conjunction “and” implies that   “complexity alone was not a ground for 
relief in equity.”51  In Wedderburn, both prerequisites were satisfied since 
the plaintiff sought an injunction, i.e., equitable relief.52 
2. Procedural limitations create the same effect as a complexity exception 
¶16 In a paper published in 1984, Douglas King argued that, even 
lacking an explicit complexity exception in English common law, “the 
procedural limits within which the jury functioned insured that no complex 
cases would ever reach the jury.”53  King based his argument on the fact that 
the limiting effects of the writ system, the strict rules of pleading, and the 
law of evidence severely narrowed the scope of common law cases heard by 
juries.54   
¶17 Under the writ system, a separate writ was required for each of the 
“narrowly and precisely” defined forms of action brought before the court.55  
According to King, the effect of this system was to “severely limit[] the 
subject matter of any single lawsuit.”56  It did so by “limit[ing] the questions 
in any particular case to a few related issues of fact or law raised by a 
                                                     
45 Id. 
46 36 & 37 Vict., ch. 66 (1873), 38 & 39 Vict., ch. 77 (1875) (cited in In re 
Japanese, 631 F.2d at 1081). 
47 In re Japanese, 631 F.2d at 1081.  
48 Order XXXVI, Rules 2, 3 (cited in In re Japanese, 631 F.2d at 1081). 
49 Id. Rule 26 (cited in In re Japanese, 631 F.2d at 1081). 
50 In re Japanese, 631 F.2d at 1081 (emphasis added). 
51 Id. 
52 See id.  See Miron, supra note 8, at 878-89 (discusses cases that demonstrate 
that the Court of Chancery invoked the complexity exception). 
53 King, supra note 3, at 584. 
54 Id. at 586-89. 
55 Id. at 587 (citing 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *153-66). 
56 Id. 
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narrowly defined form of action.”57  King argued that “this limitation made 
it unlikely that a case presented to a jury would involve more than a single 
transaction among a small number of parties.”58   
¶18 King also argued that the rules of pleadings and the law of evidence 
each contributed to the narrowing scope of the cases and ultimately 
“restricted the complexity of the cases that could be put before a jury.”59  
Under the strict rules of pleadings, every plea was required to be “simple,” 
“connected,” and “confined to one single point.” 60  In addition, parties were 
not permitted to enter pleas that would require a variety of different answers 
or involve numerous issues.61  Thus, the argument continued, this strict 
system of pleadings was implemented for the purpose of preventing juries 
from being overtaxed by complex issues.62  This strict system combined 
with the required writ system ensured that cases were short and simple, with 
the ordinary case lasting no longer than a day.63 
3. Colonial support 
¶19 Modern commentators are arguably not alone in their belief that 
some version of a complexity exception existed in English common law.  In 
the Federalist No. 83,64 Alexander Hamilton indicated that he believed that 
the English common law of 1791 withheld complex cases from juries.65      
¶20 Hamilton stated: 
My conventions are equally strong that great advantages result from 
the separation of the equity from the law jurisdiction, and that the 
causes which belong to the former would be improperly committed to 
juries.  The great and primary use of a court of equity is to give relief 
in extraordinary cases, which are exceptions to general rules. . . . 
[T]he circumstances that constitute cases proper for courts of equity 
are in many instances so nice and intricate, that they are incompatible 
with the genius of trials by jury.  They require such long, deliberate, 
and critical investigation as would be impracticable to men called from 
                                                     
57 Id. at 588. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 55, at 311 (cited in King, supra note 3, at 588). 
61 Id. 
62 King, supra note 3, at 588. 
63 Id. at 589 (citing Patrick Devlin, Jury Trial of Complex Cases: English 
Practice at the Time of the Seventh Amendment, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 43, 58 
(1980)). 
64 Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 83 (McLean’s ed.), available at 
http://www.civnet.org/resources/document/historic/fedpaper/fed83.htm (last 
visited Mar. 24, 2004). 
65 Miron, supra note 8, at 881. 
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their occupations, and obliged to decide before they were permitted to 
return to them.  The simplicity and expedition which form the 
distinguishing characters of this mode of trial require that the matter 
be decided should be reduced to some single and obvious point; while 
the litigations usual in chancery frequently comprehend a long train of 
minute and independent particulars.66 
¶21 Arguably, Hamilton believed that “intricate” cases requiring “long, 
deliberate, and critical investigation,” in other words, complex cases,  were 
“incompatible with the genius of trials by jury,” and instead were “cases 
proper for courts of equity,” or judges.  He felt that only cases involving 
some “single and obvious point” should be heard by the courts of common 
law, and, therefore, juries.  If this interpretation of Hamilton’s statements is 
accepted, it arguably represents the early American jurists’ interpretation of 
“Suits at common law,” which should dictate the scope of the Seventh 
Amendment today, making it of particular relevance to the complexity 
exception debate. 
B. Even Lacking a Basis in English Common Law, is it Otherwise 
Constitutional? 
¶22 A completely separate argument for a complexity exception is 
premised on the Fifth Amendment right of due process.  This argument was 
in fact accepted by the Third Circuit in In re Japanese when the court held 
that, when attempting to accommodate both the Fifth and Seventh 
Amendment, the appropriate action for a court to take is to deny the right to 
a jury where, due to an inability to understand the evidence and the relevant 
legal standards, a jury will be unable to perform its task of rational 
decisionmaking.67 
¶23 Due process requires that a jury “resolve each disputed issue on the 
basis of a fair and reasonable assessment of the evidence and a fair and 
reasonable application of the relevant legal rules.”68  This requirement 
presumes that a jury is able to comprehend the evidence and the relevant 
legal rules.69  If it cannot, there is “no reliable safeguard against erroneous 
decisions,” the “primary value promoted by due process in factfinding 
procedures.”70  The Third Circuit, therefore, found that a conflict exists 
between the Fifth and Seventh Amendments when a lawsuit is so complex 
that it renders a jury unable to decide the issues in a rational manner, and 
                                                     
66 Hamilton, supra note 64 (emphasis added).  
67 In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1086 (3d Cir. 
1980). 
68 Id. at 1084. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
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decided the conflict in favor of the Fifth Amendment.71  Specifically, the 
court held that “the due process objections to jury trial of a complex case 
implicate values of fundamental importance,” while the denial of a jury trial 
does not, and further that in complex cases, “the interests protected by this 
procedural rule of due process carry greater weight than the interests served 
by the constitutional guarantee of jury trial.”72  The Third Circuit, therefore, 
upheld a complexity exception to the Seventh Amendment grounded on a 
Fifth Amendment due process argument. 
C. Is There Supreme Court Support for a Complexity Exception? 
1. The famous footnote 10 
¶24 The Supreme Court fueled the debate over the existence of a 
complexity exception in its famous footnote 10 of Ross v. Bernhard.73   The 
issue in Ross was whether the Seventh Amendment guarantees a jury trial in 
shareholder derivative actions.74  The Court ultimately held that, with 
respect to those issues in a shareholder derivative action to which a right to 
a jury would attach had the corporation been suing in its own right, the right 
is afforded to the corporation’s shareholders.75   More important than the 
holding, however, was the Court’s discussion of what causes of action 
would be entitled to a jury.  In this discussion, the Court cited Parsons v. 
Bedford76 to introduce the proposition that the Seventh Amendment 
preserved the right to a jury in suits involving legal rights and remedies, and 
not those involving equitable rights and remedies.77  It further stated that the 
“Seventh Amendment question depends on the nature of the issue to be tried 
rather than the character of the overall action.”78  In clarifying how the 
nature of the issue can be determined the court then added, in a footnote: 
“[a]s our cases indicate, the ‘legal’ nature of an issue is determined by 
considering first, the pre-merger custom with reference to such questions; 
second, the remedy sought; and third, the practical abilities and limitations 
of juries.”79  
¶25 The Third Circuit has cited footnote 10 for the proposition that the 
Supreme Court has at least “left open the possibility” that the range of suits 
subject to the Seventh Amendment right to a jury may be limited by the 
                                                     
71 Id. at 1084, 1086. 
72 Id. at 1084. 
73 396 U.S. 531 (1970). 
74 Id. at 531. 
75 Id. at 532-33. 
76 28 U.S. 433 (1830). 
77 Ross, 396 U.S. at 533. 
78 Id. at 538. 
79 Id. at 538 n. 10 (emphasis added). 
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“practical abilities and limitation of juries” and that the Court does not feel 
that its prior Seventh Amendment cases preclude such a ruling.80  In 
addition, at the other end of the spectrum, the footnote is credited with 
“originating the complexity exception” altogether.81  However, some are 
leery of giving significant weight to the Court’s statement, since it was 
made in a footnote.  The Ninth Circuit, in rejecting the constitutionality of 
the “complexity exception,” held that it was “doubtful that the Supreme 
Court would attempt to make such a radical departure from its prior 
interpretation of a constitutional provision in a footnote.”82  The Third 
Circuit, on the other hand, while also finding it unlikely that the Court 
would make such an “important new application of the [S]eventh 
[A]mendment [sic] in such a cursory fashion,” held that:  
The third prong of the test plainly recognizes the significance, for 
purposes of the [S]eventh [A]mendment [sic], of the possibility that a 
suit may be too complex for a jury.  Its inclusion in the three prong test 
strongly suggests that jury trial might not be guaranteed in 
extraordinarily complex cases, even though the Parsons v. Bedford 
line of Supreme Court cases, reflected in the first two prongs, would 
read the [S]eventh [A]mendment [sic] as applying to the suits.83 
¶26 Some argue that the Supreme Court reigned in any speculation 
surrounding Ross in 1987 when it decided Tull v. United States.84  In Tull, 
the Court began its opinion by explaining that the process for determining 
whether a constitutional right to a jury trial exists required looking to both 
the nature of the cause of action and the remedy sought.85  In a footnote, the 
Court stated that it “has also considered practical limitations of a jury trial 
and its functional compatibility with proceedings outside the traditional 
courts of law in holding that the Seventh Amendment is not applicable to 
administrative proceedings,” but that “the Court has not used these 
considerations as an independent basis for extending the right to a jury trial 
under the Seventh Amendment.”86  This footnote has been interpreted by 
some as an indication that the “practical abilities and limitations of juries” 
should only be a factor in determining whether the Seventh Amendment 
applies to administrative law courts and not as a factor in determining 
                                                     
80 In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1080 (3d Cir. 
1980). 
81 Miron, supra note 8, at 886. 
82 In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 425 (9th Cir. 1979). 
83 In re Japanese, 631 F.2d at 1079-80. 
84 481 U.S. 412 (1987). 
85 Id. at 417-18. 
86 Id. at 418 n. 4 (citing Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health 
Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 454 (1997); Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 
363, 383 (1974)). 
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whether the Seventh Amendment applies to civil cases generally, and thus 
as a repudiation of the complexity exception.87 
2. Functional considerations 
¶27 The Supreme Court may have again given credence to the 
complexity exception, however, in Markman v. Westview Industries, Inc.88 
when Justice Souter listed “functional considerations” as a factor that 
district courts hearing patent cases should consider in deciding whether to 
grant a jury trial.89  In Markman, the Court held that “[w]here history and 
precedent provide no clear answers, functional considerations also play their 
part in the choice between judge and jury.”90  The Court went on to cite 
Miller v. Fenton91 for the proposition that “when an issue ‘falls somewhere 
between a pristine legal standard and a simple historical fact, the fact/law 
distinction at times has turned on a determination that, as a matter of the 
sound administration of justice, one judicial actor is better positioned to 
decide the issue in question.’”92  The Court then held that, in the case at 
issue, judges were better capable of determining the acquired meaning of 
patent terms.93  The Court’s conclusion was based on the reasoning that 
judges, who are “unburdened by training in exegesis,” construct written 
instruments more frequently and better than jurors.94  The Court went on 
further to state: 
Patent construction in particular ‘is a special occupation, requiring, 
like all others, special training and practice.  The judge, from his 
training and discipline, is more likely to give proper interpretation to 
such instruments than a jury; and he is, therefore, more likely to be 
right, in performing such a duty, than a jury can be expected to be.’95 
By basing its decision, at least in part, on what judges are likely to do better 
than juries, the Supreme Court arguably admitted that there is an exception 
to the general right of jury trial guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment 
where judges “are more likely to be right” than juries.96 
                                                     
87 Altman, supra note 6, at 706. 
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of action or the remedy sought, the Court is evidencing its support for the 
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¶28 Assuming that a “complexity exception” is constitutional, either 
because it was recognized in the English common law or because it is 
necessary to satisfy the Fifth Amendment, and assuming that the Supreme 
Court has not foreclosed such an exception, the question remains: Is an 
exception necessary or even beneficial with respect to patent infringement 
cases? 
III. COMPLEXITY EXCEPTION AS APPLIED TO PATENT 
INFRINGEMENT CASES 
¶29 Patent litigation involves some of the most complex legal theories 
and underlying factual issues of any type of litigation today.  The actors 
involved in patent infringement cases are highly specialized in their 
respective scientific fields.  For example, most patent attorneys received 
some form of technical training prior to pursuing a career as an attorney.   It 
is clearly debatable whether an average individual would be able to acquire 
enough knowledge concerning the legal nuances of patent law and the 
underlying technology specific to the case within the confines of a trial to 
render a verdict that is based solely on the facts and legal issues of that case. 
¶30 Some argue that “[p]atent litigation is inherently complex.”97  This 
argument is based primarily on the “arcane” rules for drafting claims and 
examining patents and the heightened complexity of the scientific principles 
underlying patents today.98  For example, in a patent claim the terms 
“comprising,” “consisting of,” and “consisting essentially of” have 
drastically different consequences on the scope of the patent.99  These 
principles, arguably, were “not anticipated by early patent law 
jurisprudence.”100   
¶31 Commentators on the other side of the argument contend that “it is 
not the case that all patent cases, by their very nature, are too complex for a 
jury.”101  These commentators further argue that even when a case is in fact 
overwhelmingly complex, there is still no compelling reason to remove the 
case from the jury’s consideration at least in part because “[j]udges are no 
more knowledgeable than the average citizen with regard to complex 
                                                                                                                       
existence of a “complexity exception,” and is going beyond the “historical test” 
to consider  “other facets of the English common law that had been ignored.”). 
97 Altman, supra note 6, at 699. 
98 Id. 
99 UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT 
EXAMINING PROCEDURE (8th ed., 2001), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/index.html (last modified Feb. 
2003) (describing additional rules of patent law).  
100 Altman, supra note 6, at 699. 
101 Louis S. Silvestri, A Statutory Solution to the Mischiefs of Markman v. 
Westview Industries, Inc., 63 BROOKLYN L. REV. 279, 299 (1997). 
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scientific subject matter.”102  In addition, others argue that “while the 
evidence may be complex, the counsel’s task, as an officer of the court, is to 
make it understandable to the average juror.”103  However, a 
counterargument to this second point is that this rationale for denying the 
complexity exception “misses the point of why a complexity exception 
exists,” since “presenting the issues [in a complex case] in an 
‘understandable’ way may involve glossing over many of the intricacies and 
result in an inaccurate picture of the facts.”104 
¶32 One byproduct of speculation that juries are unable to comprehend 
the subject matter of patent infringement cases is the concern that the 
decisions they render are arbitrary, unpredictable, and based on 
considerations other than the relevant law.  It is argued that “[j]ury verdicts 
in patent cases are . . . often unpredictable and inconsistent,” and because 
patents are becoming increasingly important in our economy, both 
nationally and globally, there is a “pressing need for uniformity in the 
application of patent law.”105  It is questionable whether a jury can provide 
such uniformity when it bases its decision on only a rudimentary 
understanding of the law and the inventions at issue. 
1. Practical implications 
¶33 When asked to comment on the practical implications of a 
complexity exception with respect to patent infringement cases, Patrick 
Elsevier, patent litigator, stated that, while the complexity exception is a 
“good start[,] . . . it does not go far enough.”106  As an additional step, he 
suggested having “dedicated patent trial courts.”107 
In my opinion, it would be wise to have specialized trial courts 
dedicated to hearing patent cases.  Just as there was a need for the 
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Federal Circuit to hear appeals from patent cases in order to create 
more uniformity in the law, likewise, it makes sense to have dedicated 
patent trial courts to address inconsistency at the trial court level.108   
¶34 Elsevier further suggested that the complexity exception is 
inadequate.  He stated that “[a]lthough there are trial judges who have a 
technical background and/or an affinity for patent cases, there are many 
judges who have no technical background and have had little, if any, 
exposure to patent law whatsoever.”109  The complexity exception, 
therefore, is inadequate, in his opinion, because if one of the latter judges 
were assigned a complex patent case, “there is little reason to believe that 
such a judge would decide the case much better than a competent jury.”110  
He states that the “Federal Circuit’s high rate of reversal in patent cases, 
whether decided by judge or jury, bears this out.”111 
¶35 This high rate of reversal by the Federal Circuit is also evidence 
that “Markman has made the initial trial little more than a trial run.”112  This 
is seen by Elsevier as yet another reason to create specialized patent trial 
courts. He argued:  
It does not seem to be good use of judicial (and the parties’) resources 
to have a trial judge go through the effort of interpreting the claims if 
the Federal Circuit is going to give little deference to that judge’s 
decision.  It also makes it more likely that the loser at trial will appeal 
if it knows that there is a good chance that the decision at trial will be 
overturned.  If there was a specialized trial court that construed claims 
correctly the majority of the time, it is more likely that parties, having 
a good understanding of their case, would settle after the Markman 
hearing without going through the expense of a trial or, that if the case 
did go to trial, that the losing party would forgo the expense of an 
appeal.113 
¶36 Randal Ayers, also a patent litigator, stated that he too would favor 
judges over juries in patent cases if we were “writing on a clean slate.”114  
He has seen first hand that some patent cases are “extremely complex and 
simply too much for a jury to handle.”115  While admitting that he has seen 
numerous judges struggle to apply patent law principles, he felt that they 
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“clearly do a better job than juries and are better at wading through the 
smokescreen put up by the lawyers and experts.”116 
¶37 However, Ayers recognized that we are not in fact writing on a 
clean slate.117  In fact, he finds unconvincing the arguments that a 
complexity exception was in existence in the 1791 common law.118  He 
argued instead that the commentators have selected “a predetermined 
result” and attempted to justify that result with a “selective reading of 
history.”119  Ayers feared that “[i]f citations to a few outlying cases justifies 
reversing centuries of decisions deciding the exact opposite we would not 
have any laws.”120 
¶38 In general, Ayers argued that implementing a complexity exception 
to the Seventh Amendment for patent infringement cases was not necessary 
despite the advantage of a reduction in the cost of patent litigation.121 He 
warned that it would be both difficult and inconsistently applied.122 
2. Need for restructuring of adjudication process 
¶39 From a practical perspective, suppose that you are IBM and you 
have spent countless man-hours and millions of dollars developing and 
promoting your “MEMS RF switch with low actuation voltage.”123  How 
comfortable would you feel allowing a jury of average individuals to decide 
the fate of your product where the claims of your patent look like this:  
1. A MEMS (micro-electromechanical) RF switch apparatus operable 
under low actuation voltage, the apparatus comprising: 
a substrate; 
a first electrode attached to the substrate; 






121 Ayers stated that: 
[P]atent cases are phenomenally expensive, and in many cases a relatively 
fast ruling on a dispositive defense could quickly resolve the case (if the 
defendant wins) or facilitate settlement.  If judges know they will have to 
decide the case anyway they will look for ways to focus discovery on the 
best defenses early and then move quickly to summary judgment motions.  
This could reduce the costs of patent cases tremendously. 
Id. 
122 Id. 
123 U.S. Patent No. 6,639,488 (issued Oct. 28, 2003). 
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a first layer of dielectric material having a dielectric constant above 10 
on the first electrode; 
a second electrode positioned above the first electrode creating a first 
space having a height less than 5000 Angstroms between the first layer 
of dielectric and the second electrode; and 
a support element for suspending the second electrode when the switch 
is in an open position and for moving the second electrode when the 
second electrode is pulled to the layer of dielectric material when the 
switch is in a closed position in response to a voltage between the first 
and second electrodes.124 
¶40 Now imagine that you are a juror, and you are asked to determine 
the validity of Glaxo Wellcome S.A.’s, patent for antifungal sordaricin 
derivatives125 with the following general desciption:  
A compound of general formula (I) and physiologically acceptable 
salts wherein R represents phthalidyl, (2-oxo-5-methyl-1,3-diox-olen-
4-yl)methyl or the group CHR.sub.4 OCO(O)pR.sub.5 wherein 
R.sub.4 is hydrogen or C.sub.1-4 alcyl, p is zero or I, R.sub.5 is 
C.sub.1-6 alkly, C.sub.5-8 cycloalyl (optionally substituted by 
C.sub.1-3 alkyl or carboxyl), C.sub.1-4 alkyl substituted by C.sub.1-3 
alkoxy or carboxy), C.sub.1-4 alkyl substituted by one or more groups 
selected from amino, (C.sub.1-4 alkylamino di(C.sub.1-4 alkyl)amino 
or carboxyl, phenyl (optionally substituted by carboxyl or aminoalkyl, 
C.sub.1-4 alkylaminoalkyl or di(C.sub.1-4 alkyl)aminoalcyl, or 
R.sub.5 is a 5-8 membered heterocyclic group containing 1 or 2 
heteroatoms selected from oxygen or nitrogen, processes for their 
preparation, pharmaceutical compositions containing them and their 
use in medicine.126 
How comfortable would you be with the responsibility of determining 
whether this patent is valid?  If at the end of closing statements you are still 
unsure of the meaning of certain technical terms or do not fully understand 
the legal issues, but you have been out of work for two weeks, will you be 
tempted to render a verdict based on your feelings about the parties or their 
attorneys rather than strictly on the facts of the case? 
¶41 Jurors in patent cases are put in a unique position given the highly 
complex nature of the subject matter they are asked to consider.  There is no 
doubt that some will be able to readily understand the relevant laws and the 
underlying technology, but many will struggle. There is also no doubt that 
some cases come down to nothing more than a battle of “he said, she said” 
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requiring no technical expertise whatsoever.  However, patents have 
become too important and trials have become too expensive for their 
outcomes to be left to such uncertain destinies.  Merely invoking a blanket 
exception for all patent cases may nonetheless be inappropriate, since 
judges with no background in either the technology or patent law generally 
will arguably be no better suited than jurors to try a complex patent 
infringement case, and, as stated above, the exception may not be necessary 
in all cases.   
¶42 The government’s decision to direct all patent appeals cases to a 
single court of appeals was definitely a step towards creating uniformity in 
patent verdicts.  In view of the fact that the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit is now well versed in patent law and has been given vast exposure to 
various fields of technology, it is arguably well-equipped to render rational 
and consistent verdicts.  However, this hardly seems sufficient.  Trials are 
expensive and time consuming.  Why wait until the appellate level to have 
triers of fact that are prepared to render accurate and consistent verdicts?  
While no one solution seems without flaw, it is undeniable that some 
restructuring of the adjudication system needs to occur in order to prevent 
patent infringement cases from being left to mere chance.  
CONCLUSION 
¶43 The Seventh Amendment guarantees a trial by jury for “Suits at 
common law.”  The scope of this guarantee has traditionally been 
interpreted based on the scope of the right at English common law in 1791.  
It has been argued, therefore, that because the Courts of Common Law 
(which utilized juries) under certain circumstances did not hear complex 
cases, either because the Chancellor invoked his right to remove those cases 
to the Court of Chancery or because the cases heard involved no more than 
a single issue of fact or law, the Seventh Amendment does not guarantee a 
jury trial in complex cases.  It has also been argued that even if the Seventh 
Amendment guarantees a jury trial in all cases analogous to English 
common law cases, simple or complex, the Fifth Amendment right of due 
process trumps this Seventh Amendment guarantee where a jury would be 
unable to perform its job because of a failure to grasp the legal issues or the 
underlying facts of a case. 
¶44 Assuming a complexity exception is constitutional, and even 
supported by the Supreme Court, the debate continues as to whether or not 
invoking the exception is necessary in patent infringement cases.  The legal 
issues behind patent drafting claims, the validity of patents, and patent 
infringement are difficult for even the average individual to understand 
given time and an opportunity to study.  It is questionable whether a jury 
could understand these complex legal issues sufficiently given the limited 
amount of instruction and time they are given within the confines of a trial.  
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In addition, patent cases certainly involve subject matter that was never 
conceived of in 1791.  Therefore, we must ask: Does it make sense to 
compare patent infringement cases to cases heard by the English Courts of 
Common Law in 1791?  It is also debatable whether a judge with no 
scientific background or experience with patent law will be able to decide a 
case any better than a jury.  Presumably, a judge will have a better base 
from which to understand the legal issues, but the technical and scientific 
facts may be completely foreign to him or her.  In either case, it seems 
apparent that some restructuring needs to occur in order to increase the 
uniformity in patent infringement cases and to prevent their holdings from 
being no more than a roll of the dice. 
 
